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POLITICAL-SUPPORT LOBBIES RESPONSES 
TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
 
 
Houda HAFFOUDHI? ? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
        Studies of the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) assumed a 
benevolent government who maximizes social welfare. The aim of our paper is to develop a 
theoretical framework in which the Government's decisions are influenced by green and 
producer lobbies. To this end, we extend the political support approach of Hillman (1982) 
and model the IEA formation as a two stage non-cooperative game. Our work studies the 
coalition formation process and determines both coalition abatement level and the size of 
stable coalition. The basis conclusion that emerges from the analysis of politically motivated 
coalition formation is that government’s decision depends not only on ecological 
vulnerability and abatement cost in each but also on the political strength of green lobby over 
industrial lobby and its capacities to give political support to the government. 
     
    Keywords : non-cooperative game, interest group, coalition theory, environmental Policy. 
    JEL Classification : C72, D72, D78, Q28 
     
   Résumé 
 
    La littérature économique sur la stabilité des accords environnementaux internationaux 
(AEI) suppose des gouvernements bienveillants qui maximisent la fonction de bien-être social. 
Le but de notre papier est de développer un cadre théorique dans lequel la décision d’un 
gouvernement est soumise à l’influence de deux groupes de pression : environnementaliste et 
industriel. Pour se faire, nous étendons l’approche de soutien politique de Hillman (1982) et 
modélisons la formation des AEI comme un jeu non-coopératif à deux étapes. Notre modèle 
permet d’étudier le processus de formation de la coalition et de déterminer à la fois le niveau 
de dépollution de la coalition et la taille de la coalition stable. La principale conclusions qui 
émerge de notre analyse est que la décision de participation à la coalition internationale 
dépend non seulement de sa vulnérabilité écologique et des coûts de la politique de 
dépollution mais aussi du poids politique du groupe de pression environnementaliste par 
rapport au groupe de pression industriel et sa capacité à soutenir le gouvernement.  
 
    Mots-clés: Jeux non-coopératifs, groupes de pression, théorie de la coalition, politique 
environnementale. 
   Classification JEL : C72, D72, D78, Q28 
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1 Introduction 
     
Some of the most important environmental problems urgently calling for solution are 
problems related to global pollution. Environmental problems such as ozone depletion, 
climate change and marine pollution have been the focus of intense negotiations at the 
international level over the past two decades. Given the high priority environmental problems 
receive at the policy level; it is not surprising that there is a growing effort to analyze 
International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) at the theoretical level. 
    The literature on coalition formation analyzing the IEAs has grown immensely over the 
recent years. Two basic stands may be distinguished: the first stand estimates the costs and 
benefits of various abatement targets under different cost allocation rules. Bohm and Larsen 
(1993), Fankhauser and Kverndokk (1996), Welsch (1992, 1995), and Tahvonen (1994) 
identify the winners and the losers of hypothetical agreement to reduce "greenhouse gases" 
whereas Kaitala, Pohjola and Tahvonen (1992), Mäler (1989) and Newbery (1990) identify 
them in the case of transboundary fluxes. In this literature, the rationale for a group of 
countries to form an IEA is based on whether the group as a whole is better off than in the 
statu quo. Nevertheless in this condition, one has to check whether the omnipresent free-rider 
incentive in an international context can be controlled by appropriate measures. 
    These incentives represent the focus of the second stand of literature which studies within a 
theoretical framework the conditions under which a number of countries will accede to an 
IEA and what is needed to broaden the coalition. Except Chander and Tulkens (1992, 1995), 
all papers employ stability concepts of non-cooperative game theory. The reason is that IEAs 
must be self-enforcing because no binding commitments are possible. Basically, the models 
of Barrett (1994b), Bauer (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1992, 1993) and Hoel (1992) use a 
stability concept borrowed from the oligopoly literature (D'Aspermont, et al., 1983) where a 
coalition is said to be stable if no country wants to accede to the coalition (external stability) 
and no country wants to leave the coalition (internal stability). The equilibrium size is 
determined as an adjustment process of signatories and non-signatories. This is particularly 
evident in Barrett (1994a, b) where signatories behave as Stackelberg leaders. 
    Though the above-mentioned papers do not control free-riding in a strict sense, most 
models come to the pessimistic conclusion that only two or three countries will form a stable 
coalition. Only Barrett (1994b) finds a coalition of up to N countries in the case of linear 
marginal abatement and damage costs, symmetric countries, and assuming the signatories to 
be Stackelberg leaders. The result is confirmed in the supergame version of his model. 
    The approach adopted by these works has assumed a simple government objective function 
considering the government as benevolent. However, recent events in the United States have 
illustrated the extent to which organized groups condition environmental policy, both at 
national and multilateral levels. Industry and green lobbies have been extremely influential. 
On some issues, such as multilateral emissions cuts, they have held different positions. On 
others, such as the compliance of foreign legislation with American environmental standards, 
their objectives have often coincided. It is necessary, thus, to take into account the influence 
of these groups on environmental government decision. The purpose of our paper is to 
understand how the presence of green and producer lobbies can affect the international 
environmental agreement formation and stability. 
    To analyse government behaviour at the international policy, Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 
(1994) presented the approach of "interest based explanation" They explain that government 
position can be deduced from information about the country's ecological vulnerability and 
abatement cost. This analysis suggests that countries will act as « pushers » for substantial 
emission reduction when their ecological vulnerability to environmental pollution impact is 
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high and their abatement costs for pollutant emissions are low. In contrast, countries 
characterised by high abatement costs and low ecological vulnerability can be expected to act 
as « draggers » in such negotiation due to the low benefit-cost ratio of pursuing emission 
reduction. Countries with both high ecological vulnerability and high abatement cost are 
caught in between the former two groups as they face an "intermediate" benefit-cost ratio, 
while countries that are neither affected by the environmental problem nor face high 
abatement cost will act as bystanders in international environmental negotiation. They expect 
that pusher countries take more stringent environmental positions than intermediate countries 
do, while the latter group is expected to favour environmental protection more often than 
draggers. The likelihood of bystanders' supporting environmental protection should fall 
between those for pushers and draggers; however, no direct comparison with the intermediate 
group seems to be appropriate on theoretical grounds. This study give an interesting 
explanation to government decisions at the international level but present the same 
inconvenient than the previous works, it doesn't consider national political actors and their 
effects on government policy. 
    Since we are mainly concerned with a positive analysis of both coalition formation and the 
size of a stable IEA, we assume then that authorities, rather than seeking social welfare 
objectives, pursue their own self-interest motives maximizing their political support. 
    This paper is part of an increasing vast political economy literature which examines the 
influence of interest groups on policy-making. To our knowledge, rare are studies looking at 
the role of green and industrial lobbies on the IEAs formation and stability. A more recent 
body of literature, which includes Frederiksson (1997), Aidt (1998) and Conconi (2000a, 
2000b, 2001) studies the political economy of environmental policy. These studies adopt the 
political contribution approach to analyse the impact of green and producer interest on 
environmental policy. The former studies treat only environmental policy when the later 
investigates the joint determination of trade and environmental policy. But none examines the 
effect of lobbing by green and producer groups on the formation and stability of IEA. 
    The analysis presented in this paper looks at the relationship between interest groups and 
policy-makers. Most studies have focused on the role of producer groups in the determination 
of trade policy. In this area, the political contributions approach of Grossman and Helpman 
(1994, 1995, 1996) has became something of a work-horse model (see Cadot et al (1997), 
Rama and Tabellini (1998) and Mitra (1999), among many other). A similar approach, 
originally developed by Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), and first applied to trade policy 
by Hillman (1982), describes trade policy as being set by an incumbent government seeking 
to maximize its political support. A third approach, developed by Hillman and Ursprung 
(1988) and Magee et al. (1989), focuses on the electoral competition among political parties. 
Here lobbies do not directly affect policy choice, but do, instead, affect the probability of their 
favourite party to be elected. Alternatively, Austen-Smith (1997) views the policy-making 
process as being characterized by uncertainty. In his framework, interest groups influence the 
provision of informational expertise. Most studies on the political economy of trade have 
disregarded the environmental impact of trade and the role of green lobbies. Two notable 
exceptions in this respect are Hillman and Ursprung (1992, 1994), who introduced 
environmental lobby groups in a model of endogenous trade policy. 
    In order to examine the impact of green and industrial lobbies on IEAs formation and 
stability, we extend the analysis of Hillman (1982) using the approach that models the 
formation of IEAs as a two stage non-cooperative game (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993). In the 
first stage, governments decide on their membership in a coalition; in the second stage, 
coalition members choose their abatement strategies. Governments signing the IEA form a 
coalition and behave cooperatively by maximizing the coalition's aggregate political support 
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function. Governments that do not participate in the agreement behave non-cooperatively by 
maximizing their individual political support function. 
    We organized the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical 
model. In section 3, we consider the political equilibrium under the assumption that 
governments maximize their political support function. In section 4, we determine the size of 
the stable IEAs and study the effect of taking into account lobby pressures. Finally, in section 
5, we conclude and discuss some interesting extensions of the model. 
 
 
2 The Model 
 
2.1     Background: 
 
We consider n identical countries. We focus on the political and economic structure of each 
country. Production in each country i, i=1…N, generates emissions that damage a shared 
environmental resource. In each country, we distinguish two types of individuals. First, we 
have the environmentalists whose current abatement benefits are assumed to depend on 
current total abatement as follows 
 
(1)  
2
( ) ( )
2
QB Q b aQ= −   avec Q≤a.   
     
where B(Q)1 is abatement benefit of environmentalist in country i which is the country benefit 
from the pollution abatement policy. a and b are positive parameters and i
i
Q q=∑  is global 
abatement. We suppose that only environmentalists have environmental concerns and that 
their ideal abatement level is E
aq
N
= . 
 
Second, we have producers which are harmed by abatement decision and their abatement 
costs are assumed to depend on its own abatement level and no one else's. Their ideal 
abatement level is 0Iq = . The abatement cost function is assumed to be given by 
 
(2)  2( )
2 ii i
cAC q q=  
 
     
    Where ACi(qi) is i's abatement cost of producer group in country i and iq  is i's abatement, 
such that i
i
Q q=∑ . This cost isn't sufficiently high to make producer profit negative. 
    Our model does not explain the process of lobby formation. We simply assume that only 
two groups of citizens overcome the free-riding problem described by Olson (1965) and get 
politically organized: a proportion of the population, the "environmentalists", who form a 
national green lobby and the industrialists, who form producer lobby. This model is first 
concerned with establishing the effects of political support motives on the determination of 
emission abatement within a two stage non-cooperative game and then the number of 
countries signing a stable IEA. 
                                                 
1 The present benefit and cost functions specifications are those proposed by Barrett (1994). 
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    Consider green lobby group. It gains from the increases in total (global) abatement effort, 
this means that an environmentalist group in a country j will support its own government 
when it participates to the global abatement but also even though abatement effort has been 
made in some country i. This means that government will be rewarded by its environmentalist 
group for having incited other government to participate to the collective abatement effort. 
But, global benefit isn't sufficient to explain why an environmentalist group is supporting its 
own government. We assume that it will only do so when its own government undertakes 
additional abatement effort. To introduce this condition, we suppose that environmentalists 
are harmed by the damage caused by the non-abated emissions consisting in the difference 
between their ideal point ( Eq ) and their country current abatement level ( iq ). This damage 
allows environmentalist group to sanction its government both when it doesn't take any 
abatement decisions and when its abatement decision is lower than environmentalist ideal 
abatement level ( Eq ) Then the more the government abatement level is closed to the 
environmentalist group ideal point, the more it will be supported.  
 
The environmentalist lobby support depends also on government decision about its 
participation to IEA.  If government decides to participate then environmentalist lobby group 
considers not only national damage but also damages generated in the signatories’ countries.  
However, if government decides not to participate to the IEA then environmentalist lobby 
group takes in its consideration only national damage. Therefore, we can specify 
environmental lobby gain function as follow: 
 
(3)  
( ) ( , )
( , ) ( ) ( , )
i i E
i i E
i i E
i
B Q D q q si i est non signataire
g q q B Q D q q si i est signataire
− −=  − ∑  
        2( , ) ( )
2i i E E i
bD q q q q= −  is the damage caused by the non-abated emissions consisting in 
the difference between their ideal point ( E
aq
N
= ) and their country current abatement level 
( iq ).  
   
The industrial lobby group is always harmed by the government decision of abatement 
level. The ideal decision for the industrial lobby is not to abate ( 0Iq = ). Its abatement cost is 
assumed to depend on its own abatement level and nor one else's and it takes the following 
form: 
 
(4)  ( ) ( )i i i il q AC q=  
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
The abatement level derives from maximization by authorities of their political support 
function. 
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(5)  [ ]( ) ( , ), ( )i i i i E i iM q M g q q l q=       
     
Higher gain elicit greater political support from environmentalists which can be reflected by 
0gM > , but producer are harmed by higher abatement, so 0lM > . To analyze the effect of 
lobbies’ pressures on government decision we have to choice one specification of our political 
support function. We choice to this purpose a linear additive function of lobbies' political 
support. Let  
 
 
( ) ( , ) ( )i i i i i E i iM q g q q l qρ= −     
 
With ρi >0, ρi dénotes the government i's political support function such that ρi reflects the 
political strength of green over producer lobby which depends on its capacities to be 
organized and then to give political support to the government for its abatement decision.  
 
The noncooperative or open access outcome can be computed by invoking the usual Cournot 
conjecture that each country chooses its emission level taking the other countries' emissions 
as given. That is, each government chooses qi to maximize Mi. Let qinc the non cooperative 
abatement level at the equilibrium such that  
  
 
( ) ( , ) ( )i i
nc nc
i i E iMB Q MD q q MAC qρ  − =   
 
 
MB, MDi and MACi represent respectively marginal benefit, marginal damage and marginal. 
Abatement cost. Since we have assumed complete symmetry between countries, the first 
order condition of the above maximization problem yields country i's abatement reaction 
function, 
 
(6)  [ ][ ]Enci
a q
q
N
ρ
ρ ρ λ
+= + +      
 
Such that c
b
λ = . Consequently, the aggregate abatement level under the (purely) non-
cooperative case is [ ][ ]. Enc nci
N a q
Q N q
N
ρ
ρ ρ λ
+= = + +  which verifies
ncQ a≤ .   
     
 
Under full cooperation, the grand coalition maximizes the global net benefits:  
 
( ) ( , ) ( )i i
c c
i i E i
i N
MB Q MD q q MAC qρ
∈
 − = ∑  
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The first order yields the aggregate abatement level, [ ]2
2
Ec N a qQ
N N
ρ
ρ ρ λ
+=  + + 
 ( cQ a≤ ). 
Since each country contributes ( 1
n
) of the total emissions abatement, the per country 
abatement level is: 
 
   
  (7)  [ ]
2
Ec N a qq
N N
ρ
ρ ρ λ
+=  + + 
 
 
 
We see immediately that c ncQ Q> , each country is better off at the full cooperative solution 
( ( ) ( )c c nc nci i i iM q M q> 2). However, in this one stage game, purely simultaneous framework, 
each country has incentives to cheat on the agreement and free-ride on the emission reduction 
achieved by the countries complying with the agreement.  
 
In what follows we examine the two stage framework where the incentive to free-ride on 
the coalition cooperating efforts may be offset by the adjustment of coalition' abatement upon 
a member's deviation. The equilibrium number of countries participating in an IEA is derived 
by applying the notions of internal and external stability of a coalition originally developed by 
D'Aspremont et al. (1983) and extended to IEAs by Barrett (1994). To this end we use the 
Hillman (1982) model of political support function. This model is first concerned with 
establishing the effects of political support motives on the determination of emission 
abatement within a two stage non-cooperative game and then on the number of countries 
signing a stable IEA. 
     
 
2.2    Political-support Lobbies responses to IEAs 
 
Our model is concerned with establishing the effects of political support motives on the 
determination of emission abatement within a two stage non-cooperative game and then on 
the number of countries signing a stable IEA. Suppose that it were so as assumed in Hillman 
(1982) that political support depends upon gainers' and losers' welfare level. Consider green 
lobby-specific interests. They gain as a consequence of increases in abatement level that are 
due to a participation in an IEA. There are more global benefit and less damage when moving 
from the non cooperative abatement level (status quo) to the negotiated one. The same 
considerations apply to industrial lobbies. They may blame with justification the authorities 
for welfare losses due to domestic abatement level rises that have been the consequence of 
participating to an IEA. 
  
Suppose, therefore, that the political support function reflects the constituent component of 
abatement level, with agents responsive in their political support only to gains and losses that 
are due to the authorities' decisions of signing an IEA. Let ( , )nci i iG q q , denotes the increase in 
green lobby-specific returns due to an increase in abatement level in each country. Clearly 
                                                 
2 Mic(qc) (Minc(qnc) ) is a monotone function, it increases until qc* (qnc* )and decrease after, such that Mic(0)=ρ 
(qE)2bN/2 (Mic(0)=ρ (qE)2b/2).  As qc* >qnc*, We have always Mic(qc)≥Minc(qnc) (Mic(qE) =Minc(qE)). 
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0
iq
G > (only when Q a< ) and 0
i iq q
G < . And let ( , )nci i iL q q  denote the losses derived by 
agents harmed by the increase in abatement level in each country, relative to the abatement 
level they would obtain when authorities don't sign IEA, where then 0
iq
L >  and 0
i iq q
L > . 
With these functions forming the basis of lobbies' political response, the political support 
function of authorities in country i is: 
 
         
(8)    ( , ) ( , ) ( , )nc nc nci i i i i i i i i iM q q G q q L q qρ= −       
   
Higher environmentalist’s profits elicit greater political support from green lobby, which is 
reflected in 0GM > , but industrial lobby is antagonized by higher abatement level, so 0LM <  
(Hillman, 1982)3. Following Hillman hypothesis, then constant verify 0iρ > .This 
specification considers that government objective is to maximize its own welfare, and iρ  is a 
ponderation which can take low and high values following the capacity of each lobby group 
to influence policymaker’s decisions. 
 
   More specifically, the green lobby gain is specified as a profit variation when government 
move from the noncooperative level to the negotiated level 
     
(9)    ( , ) ( , ) ( , )nc nci i i i i E i i EG q q g q q g q q= −  
  
     
and the same considerations apply to the industrial lobby: 
 
(10)   ( , ) ( ) ( )nc nci i i i i i iL q q l q l q= −      
            
 
Following this specification of the environmentalist and industrial lobbies’ political 
support, the more the non cooperative abatement level is different from the negotiated one the 
more important is the variation of the support. Concerning the environmentalist lobby group, 
( , )nci i iG q q is higher when government decides to be a signatory than when it decides to 
defect. In fact, the variation ( , )i i Eg q q , from 
nc
iq to iq , is higher when government decide to 
sign the IEA than when it decide not to be a member. Abating 
i
sq generates an important 
environmentalist lobby support to the signatories as global benefit is higher and damages are 
lower (equation (3)). Concerning industrial lobby group, the lower is the abatement cost the 
higher is its political support. Then the closer is the negotiated abatement level ( iq ) to the non 
cooperative one the more government is supported.  
     
 
 
                                                 
3 We suppose in our case that 0, 0 0GG LL GLM M and M= = = ( Peltzman eliminated also envy 
effect).   
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3 The equilibrium 
 
In order to examine the impact of green and industrial lobbies on IEAs formation and 
stability, we extend the analysis of Hillman (1982) using the approach that models the 
formation of IEAs as a two stage non-cooperative game. Following this approach, 
governments facing an international environmental problem play a two-stage game. In the 
first stage-the coalition game- they decide non-cooperatively whether or not to sign the 
agreement. In the second stage, they play the non-cooperative Nash emission game, where 
governments, which sign the agreement, play as a single player and divide the resulting 
payoff according to a given burden-sharing rule. 
 
Let us begin with analysing the outcome of the game under alternative strategic combination. 
First, we assume that governments decide simultaneously in both stages4. Second, 
governments are proposed to sign a single agreement. Hence, those which do sign cannot 
propose a different agreement. From a game theoretical viewpoint, this implies that only one 
coalition can be formed, the remaining defecting players playing as singletons. We also 
suppose that when defecting from coalitions, each country assumes that the other 
governments belonging to s remain in it. 
 
Given theses assumptions, as presented by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) we say that: 
-     A coalition s is stable iff: 
    1. There is no incentive to free-ride, i.e., ( 1) ( ) 0ns si iM s M s i s− − < ∀ ∈  where ( 1)nsiM s −  is 
country i's payoff when it defects from coalitions,  
    2. There is no incentive to broaden the coalition, i.e., ( 1) ( ) 0s nsi iM s M s i s+ − < ∀ ∈ 5.  
- A stable coalition s is also Pareto optimal if there exist no other stable coalition which 
provides all countries with a payoff larger than ( )siM s i s∀ ∈ .   
      
We suppose that a number of governments negotiate an IEA. We assume that the relative 
political weight ( ρ ) that each government gives to green lobby over industrial lobby 
constitute the characteristic that differs it from others. That is, we have two groups of 
countries which participate to the international negotiation process the signatories ( sρ ) and 
non signatories ( )nsρ . We assume that (s) governments sign an agreement and ( )N s−  do not. 
Let sQ denote the abatement level of the coalition, and siq  denotes the abatement of any 
individual signatory, such that s siQ sq= . In a similar manner, each non-signatory 
government's abatement is nsiq  yielding a total abatement of all non signatories 
( )ns nsiQ N s q= − .Global abatement level is ( ) ns si iQ N s q sq= − +  
     
  The non signatories behave non-cooperatively. Their maximization problem results to a best 
response function of the form presented earlier. Non signatory governments choose their 
                                                 
4 By contrast, Barrett (1994) assumes that the group of signatories is Stackelberg leader with 
respect to non-signatories in the second stage emission game. In Bloch (1997) it is assumed 
that countries play sequentially in the first stage coalition game.  
5 This definition of stability coincides with the definition of stable cartel provided in the 
oligopoly literature (D'Aspremont et al, 1983) and defines the Nash equilibrium of the first 
stage( the one in which countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement). 
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abatement level on the belief that the abatement levels of all other countries are given. That is, 
each government chooses nsiq  to maximize  
 
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
i i i i
ns ns nc ns nc ns nc
i ns i i i iM q q G q q L q qρ= −  
 
 
The condition describing the authorities’ political support maximizing choice of abatement 
level is: 
   
(11)  ( ) ( , ) ( )i i
ns ns
ns i E iMB Q MD q q MAC qρ  − =       
   
  
    so, balancing at the margin support from green lobby who favor abatement rises against 
political disfavor due to industrial lobby opposition. The abatement level which solves (11) 
yield a maximum for ( nsiq ) which lies between the benefit maximizing (Q a= ) and cost 
minimizing (qi=0) abatement level.  
 
    Since we have assumed complete symmetry between governments, the first order condition 
of the above maximization problem yields government i's abatement reaction function, 
  
 (12)  ( )
s
ns Ens
ns ns
a q Q
q
N s
ρ
ρ χ
 + − = − +  
     
 
Where ns nsχ ρ λ= + such that cbλ = . The aggregate non-signatory abatement level is 
( )
( ) sns Ens
ns ns
N s a q Q
Q
N s
ρ
ρ χ
 − + − = − +  
 
    Signatories choose their abatement level by maximizing their collective political support 
function. That is, signatories choose sQ by solving the following constrained maximization 
problem. 
 
  
( )1 ,..., ( , ) ( , ) ( , )s s i i i in s s nc s nc s nci s i i i iq q i s i sMax M q q G q q L q qρ∈ ∈  = − ∑ ∑    
   
where sM is the political support function of each signatory. Then, at the equilibrium we have 
 
(13)   ( ) ( , ) ( )i i
s s
s i E i
i s
MB Q MD q q MAC qρ
∈
 − = ∑  
 
Thus, joining coalition s has the advantage that own abatement efforts are matched by other 
members and hence higher benefits and lower damages but also means higher abatement cost. 
To be member of the coalition means that each signatory government considers not only its 
damage but also all member damage. Non signatory government considers contrary only its 
own damages. Both effects determine whether a coalition is stable. 
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    The first order condition yields the aggregate abatement of signatories, 
[ ]
²
²
ns
s Es
s s
s a q Q
Q
s
ρ
ρ χ
 + − = +  , where s ssχ ρ λ= + . The individual government's abatement level 
is, 
  
(14)  2
_ nss Es
s s
s a q Q
q
s
ρ
ρ χ
 + =  +     
 
   
Proposition 1: 
 
Each government abatement level decision depends not only on its national political process 
but also on the political process in the foreign country. The signatory and non signatory 
government individual abatement level, take the following form  [ ]
( )2
s ns Es
s ns ns s s ns
s a q
q
s N s
ρ χ
ρ χ ρ χ χ χ
+= + − +   et 
[ ]
( )2
ns s Ens
s ns ns s s ns
a q
q
s N s
ρ χ
ρ χ ρ χ χ χ
+= + − +  
  
  
 
Like the previous two cases where 0ncq >  and 0cq >  always holds, in the coalition 
formation case we have always 0sq > and 0nsq >  which guarantees that our solutions are 
interior. The remaining problem is to determine the number of signatories to the self-
enforcing IEA. 
  
 
4 The size of stable IEAs 
 
We now proceed with the determination of the size of the stable IEA, denoted by s*, using the 
internal and external stability conditions. Recall that the internal stability condition ensures 
that if a government were to defect unilaterally, its gains from free riding would be 
outweighed by the adjustment (due to its defection) of abatement levels of the remaining 
members of the IEA. The external stability condition ensures that no other non signatory 
government finds it beneficial to unilaterally join the IEA; formally, the internal and external 
stability conditions satisfy this definition: 
 
Definition: An IEA consisting of s signatories is self-enforcing if 
* * * *( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( )s ns s nsM s M s et M s M s> − + <  
 
        
To analyse government behaviour at the international negotiations and its decision to 
participate to the IEA, we first use the approach of “interest based explanation” of 
international environmental policy proposed by Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994). Then, 
government position can be deduced from information about the country’s ecological 
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vulnerability (b) and abatement cost(c). By combining this two indicators, government can be 
classified into four categories as follow: 
 
Figure 1: Prediction of interest-based explanation from government 
negotiating position 
 
ecological vulnerability  
Low High 
Low Bystanders  Pushers  abatement 
cost 
High Draggers  Intermediates   
   Sources : Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994, 8 
 
 
This analysis suggests that countries will act as « pushers » for substantial emission reduction 
when their ecological vulnerability to environmental pollution impact is high and their 
abatement costs for pollutant emissions are low. In contrast, countries characterised by high 
abatement costs and low ecological vulnerability can be expected to act as « draggers » in 
such negotiation due to the low benefit-cost ratio of pursuing emission reduction.  Countries 
with both high ecological vulnerability and high abatement cost are caught in between the 
former two groups as they face an “intermediate” benefit-cost ratio, while countries that are 
neither affected by the environmental problem nor face high abatement cost will act as 
bystanders in international environmental negotiation. 
We expect that pusher countries take more stringent environmental positions than 
intermediate countries do, while the latter group is expected to favour environmental 
protection more often than draggers. The likelihood of bystanders’ supporting environmental 
protection should fall between those for pushers and draggers; however, no direct comparison 
with the intermediate group seems to be appropriate on theoretical grounds. To simplify our 
presentation we suppose that b and c take three values (0.01, 1,100). 
This interest-based perspective on international environment regulation offers a partial but 
parsimonious view of how government’s decisions to participate to the international 
environmental agreements are shaped. The interest based explanation allows an initial 
understanding of possible positions taking by countries in international environmental 
negotiations. Many factors influence governmental position in the international negotiations. 
As the study by Weiss and Jacobson (1998) demonstrates, country-specific factors such as the 
wealth of a country, the domestic institutional structure, and the political strength of 
environmental NGOs vis-à-vis major polluting industries influence government participation 
to IEA. 
Then, ecological vulnerability and abatement cost can not be sufficient to explain 
government behaviour. Government decision about its participation to the international 
environmental agreement depends on the types of its domestic political actors and their 
interest. Theses interests can be represented respectively by industrial and environmental 
lobby group. The influence of these actors is measured by ρs and ρns respectively in the 
signatories and in the non signatories countries. Tables 1-4 present solution to s* for various 
values of b, c, ρs and ρns when n=100, a=1000. Simulation shows that the number of 
signatories to the self-enforcing IEA varies not only with b and c but also depends on the 
strength of environmentalist vis-à-vis major polluting industries in both signatories’ and non 
signatories’ countries. High ρs (1,5; 2) means that government give more weight to the 
environmental lobby group support, that is, this group is more able to be organized and to 
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influence government decision. Inversely, when ρs is low (0,2; 0,5) this means that industrial 
lobby group is more able to influence  government decision. ρs =1 means that government is 
indifferent between environmental lobby group and industrial lobby group.    
We test all coalition structures for stability using our political economy model. We can 
observe that once governments include in their decisions the level of political lobby support 
the stability and the size of coalition increase. More specifically, when signatories are 
expected to be more influenced by environmental, stable coalition, if it exists, is of size 2. 
There are only internally stable coalitions, but none of these is externally stable. The situation 
does not improve much when signatories are indifferent between the two existing lobbies, in 
this case only one possibility gives a stable coalition, that is, when non-signatories are 
influenced by environmental lobby group and then s*=2 or 9.   
If signatories decide to accept only the contributions of the industrial lobby, the stable 
coalition emerges independently of which lobby group is able to influence non signatories’ 
decision. In this case, except for identical countries, there are no non-trivial stable coalitions 
in our different scenarios. Among these, the grand coalition (i.e. an agreement of all 
countries) is stable.  
 
 
Proposition 2:  
 
Once governments include in their decisions the level of political pressure that the lobby 
groups exert, stability and size of coalition increase. Basically, industrial lobby support 
reduces the incentive of free riding and can incite signatory governments to sustain the grand 
coalition when the non signatory government have different national political support.  
 
However, the extent of this improvement is determined mainly by each government 
abatement cost and benefit characteristics. To this end we consider the situation in which we 
have stable coalitions. That is, we consider the case in which signatories are more influenced 
by industrial lobby group than by environmental lobby group. More specifically we will 
analyze the scenario ρs =0.5 and ρns=1.5.   
  
 
Table 1: The size of stable coalition when ρs =0.5 and ρns=1.5. 
 
b: ecological vulnerability  
0.01 1 100 
0.01 Grand coalition Grand coalition Grand coalition 
1 19 Grand coalition Grand coalition 
c: 
abatement 
cost 100 11 19 Grand coalition 
 
 
 
From the table 1 we observe that, when signatories are more supported by industrial lobby 
group whereas non signatories are instead more supported by environmental lobby group, a 
self-enforcing international environmental agreement is stable. Nevertheless, the size of this 
stable IEA depends of the cost benefit structure of the government.  
 
In this case, when governments are expected to behave as pushers, the stable coalition which 
emerges is a Grand coalition. Given that ecological vulnerability is higher than abatement 
costs, an IEA sustains also large number when signatories continue to be influenced by 
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industrial lobby group. Indeed, if governments (signatories and non signatories) expected to 
behave as Pushers, have industrial support such non signatories governments are more 
supported nationally by their environmental lobby group than signatories one (ρs = 0,2; ρns 
=0.5) the size of stable coalition is s*=18. When governments are expected to behave as 
Intermediates or Bystanders they enjoy a maximum political support level when the size of 
stable coalition is also large (grand coalition). This happens independently of which lobby 
group influence non signatory decision. Finally, when governments face high cost and are not 
very ecologically vulnerable, that is, when they are expected to behave as draggers, the size of 
stable coalition which correspond to the maximum level of national political support is the 
smallest one compared to the others governments types, s*=11 or 19. Indeed, when non 
signatories give more weight to environmental lobby than signatories then Draggers Prefer 
not to leave the IEA. 
 
Table 2:  Government political support (signatories and non signatories) for 
each value of b and c under the IEA outcome (ρs =0.5 and ρns=1.5). 
 
b: ecological vulnerability  
0.01 1 100 
0.01 0,9236 
0,5155 
0.0096 
0.0065 
9.6006  e-5 
6.5301 e-5 
1 689.8738 
717.4429 
92,3461 
51.5520 
0.9603 
0.6507 
c: abatement 
cost 
100 55.4156 
63.2910 
6.8987 e+4 
7.1744 e+4 
9,2356 e+3 
5.1552 e+3 
 
 
 
Table 2 shows the different level of payoff function for each type of government in the 
situation in which they all enjoy industrial lobby group support. The analysis of this result 
shows that Draggers are the more gainer when they participate to the international 
environment agreement. They enjoy a high level of political support when they sustain a 
small stable IEA. Those who gains the least are Pushers. When they participate to grand 
coalition, they gain less compared to bystanders and intermediate who decide to form a large 
coalition and less than draggers who prefer to free-ride (s*=11 or 19).  
  
 
Proposition 3:  
 
Pusher countries take more stringent environmental positions than intermediate countries do, 
while the latter group favour environmental protection more often than draggers. The 
likelihood of intermediate and bystanders’ supporting environmental protection globally fall 
between those for pushers and draggers. 
 
 
The most important result given by our simulation is that an IEA can avoid the problem of 
free riding and sustain a large number of signatories (Grand coalition). This is the case when 
governments are more influenced by industrial lobby group. This grand coalition can be 
explained by the fact that governments which were non signatory will abate less when and 
become signatory and form the grand coalition than in the non cooperative situation.(Table 
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3a, 3b). In this situation the signatory government will abate their cooperative abatement level 
when the grand coalition is formed.  
 
 
Table 3 a: Abatement level of respectively signatories and non signatories 
governments for each value of b and c under the IEA outcome 
 
b: ecological vulnerability  
0.01 1 100 
0.01 9.9980* 
6.1188 
10 
9.9357 
10 
9.9994 
1 9.7868 
3.8815 
9.9980 
6.1188 
10 
9.9357 
c: abatement 
cost 
100 0.5446 
0.1486 
9.7868 
3.8815 
9.9980 
6.1188 
* means that qs=9,9980 and qns=6.1188 
 
Table 3 b: Cooperative and non cooperative abatement level of signatories 
and non signatories governments (qc and qnc) for each value of b and c 
under the IEA outcome 
 
b: ecological vulnerability  
0.01 1 100 
0.01 9,9980 / 9,8058 
9,9993 / 9,9344 
10 / 9,9980* 
10 / 9,9993 
10 / 10 
10 / 10 
1 9,8058 / 3.3555 
9,9344 / 6,0239 
9,9980 / 9,8058 
9,9993 / 9,9344 
10 / 9,9980* 
10 / 9,9993 
c: abatement 
cost 
100 3.3555 / 0,0502 
6,0239 / 0,1492 
9,8058 / 3.3555 
9,9344 / 6,0239 
9,9980 / 9,8058
9,9993 / 9,9344
* means that for he signatories qc=10 and qnc=9,9980, and for the non signatories qc=10 and 
qnc=9,9993 
 
Intermediate and bystanders, when they participate to the IEA, abate more than in the Non 
cooperative situation. However, this difference is small which may explain why coalition can 
sustain a large number of signatories. 
When λ is high and particularly when c is very high the difference in individual abatement 
under Full cooperation and Non cooperative outcome is trivial which explains the small size 
of stable coalition and the behaviour of free riding adopted by draggers. 
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5 Conclusion: 
 
This paper has shown that self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEA), 
which establish rules for managing shared environmental resources may sustain a large 
number of signatories, that is, may be able to improve substantially upon the non cooperative 
outcome. 
    To prove this result, we have employed a political economy model in witch green and 
producer lobbies participate in the determination of environmental policy. In contrast to the 
existing literature, in this paper, the international environmental negotiation has been 
considered beginning from the premise that authorities will choose abatement levels on the 
basis of political support motives. So not perceptions of social justice, but rather the 
authorities' perceptions of their own political self-interest determine the environmental policy. 
To portray politically motivated interventionist behavior, we have adopted Hillman model 
originally presented in Stigler-Peltzman regulatory model to view the beneficiaries of gainers 
and losers from government participation to IEAs. 
    The basis conclusion that emerges from the analysis of politically motivated coalition 
formation decision depends not only on values taken by λ ((b/c)) but also on the political 
strength of green lobby over industrial lobby (ρ) which depends on its capacities to be 
organized and to give political support to the government for its abatement decision. 
    We used the "interest based explanation" to have explanation of support for international 
environmental negotiation. Operationalized as the degree of ecological vulnerability (b) and 
cots of abatement (c), we expected that countries could be typified as pushers, intermediates, 
draggers and bystanders in international environmental negotiation. We find that we have 
different type of governments corresponding to each one. Therefore, we conclude that 
government decision about IEA depends not only on λ but also on domestic political factors. 
Industrial and environmental lobbying effort could each play an important role. 
    It is more probably to see draggers who deviate from IEA when as signatories are more 
supported by industrial lobby group than non signatories. Then the self-enforcing 
international environmental agreement will not be able to sustain more than 2 countries which 
confirm previous literature. In contrary, pushers are the most incited one to participate to the 
self-enforcing IEA when as non signatories are more supported by environmental lobby group 
than signatories. The self-enforcing IEA will be signed by a lot of countries when abatement 
costs are low and ecological vulnerability are high (λ≤1) and signatory and non-signatory 
governments are more supported by industrial lobby than environmental lobby (Pusher) or 
both are supported by industrial lobby group (Bystanders). In contrast, with the same national 
political support when countries are characterised by high abatement costs and low ecological 
vulnerability (draggers, λ>1) then a self-enforcing IEA may not be able to sustain more than 2 
signatories government.. 
    Nevertheless, usually we found that Pusher countries will always take more stringent 
environmental positions than intermediate countries do, while the latter group favour 
environmental protection more often than draggers. The likelihood of bystanders' supporting 
environmental protection globally falls between those for pushers and draggers; however, no 
direct comparison with the intermediate group seems to be appropriate. 
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